The Most Absconded Theory
In this article I will write not as a philosopher, but as a layperson, yet someone who has gained incredible perspective on numerous inspiring subjects. And I will not focus on philosophy as a discipline. I will not dote on ethics, or fall prey to epistemology. This writing will be devoid of systems. I suspect that a philosopher would find it meaningless.
I will not even consider art, poetry, or common-sense to be worthy of discussion. This work will not have the cleverness of Voltaire or the novelty of Montaigne. It will introduce no new subject to the list of potential queries, nor will it make any lashing rebuke to the traditions of philosophy, culture, or criticism.
This is by no means a political writing. Perhaps a crazy person could call it mathematics. It involves a certain type of dynamic energy. It takes up space. You may ask, well it must do something! Perhaps it is anything, or using a principle, everything.
Does it have a category? Can we know what it is? It's category is miscellaneous. It might be an old novel, or a new tradition. It comes across as unexpected, yet it is not that it doesn't follow rules. There is certainly a playbook. Something might be listed somewhere about it, say in a very hodgepodge reference index, or on the cover. Perhaps somewhere on the internet. But the list is indirectly related. It says something, but it does not say everything.
It may be said, we know something about this thing. Maybe we know its name, or part of its ingredients, or a little bit of its history. We could almost make another object out of this extra material, but it would not be the same. It would refer but it would not confer.
We know that we relate with this thing, whatever it is. We may not relate very reliably, or with a definite perspective on the subject, but it is certain that it "does" something, and thus we know enough to say that this thing has "a shape", even if the shape is not something real, we know that if the object is not completely real, then we know in some way that that is true. We know if the form is real or unreal, or we know at least that the definition we form may be real or unreal, and understood as such, whether it is one way or the other. What we understand makes a difference in how we understand the thing, objectively.
If the thing changes we can say that it has more than one property. We might need quantity to understand it. Or it may be that our perspective is changing while the object remains the same. The object refers to something unchanging, or it refers to a language like mathematics that 'does something' or 'has a form'.
In this regard, the unchanging may be defined by an idealist, or by a pessimist. The pessimist can say that the unchanging has no property, because no property would be useful. The idealist would say that the definition of the unchanging is anything we want it to be. Even if the unchanging is ultimately something definite, what we know about it may be entirely different from what it is.
We may decide that we know a great deal about it, but that it is NOT very significant. Or we may decide that what we know is insignificant, but the thing is VERY complex. But there is no reason to decide that the thing is INSIGNIFICANT and COMPLEX, or that what we know is INSIGNIFICANT, and that we KNOW a great deal about it.
What do we say if the object itself does not change? We say that it is unchanging OR false. Our perceptions about it cause death or immortality. The object is in this way not influencing who we become, unless it has a positive or negative effect. There is no reason it would have a neutral effect, because such a thing is virtually impossible. Neutral effects from a mute object only exist artificially. In other words, if there is an accident, it must consist of something. It implies a cause.
What if the object is changeable, rather than permanent? Then it doesn't reflect the unchanging, instead it always indicates that something ACTUALLY IS changing. Whether it is our own perceptions, or an object in the world, there is no reason to think that one or the other is more 'responsible' about unchanging forms. If perception is an accident, then so too changes in the world can be objective. If perception isn't an accident, there is no reason to think that perceptions give subjective experiences. In either case, the conclusion is that change is objective, and not a delusion.
So what is our understanding of this unchanging or mutable object, of miscellaneous properties? For one thing, the only case in which we do not understand it is a case in which the object is ambiguous. Otherwise we must say that the object refers to something, or that it has properties of dynamism.
Working from reference and dynamism in this context, we can say that any given thing either causes reality or has a 'mechanic', and in other cases it is justly ambiguous. If we endeavor to find ambiguity we will find stretched truths and politics. If we endeavor to find mechanics, we will find reality, and if we endeavor to find reality we will find mechanics. Sometimes when we find neutrality we will find comparison, and when we find ambiguity we will find arbitration.
Clearly the paradox is not dead, but that is not to say that anything that can be said is true. And certainly if nothing that could be said were true, then we would determine that lies do not deceive.
It is clearer to say that any context consists of three categories: mechanics, causation, and ambiguity.
And if someone disagrees with you, you can just say 'you're not being objective'.
As true as subjectivity might be, it doesn't paint a complete picture. Essentially, every subjective position is an application of some context of definition which refers to a common reality. The emotions might not be common, but if they are not accidents then they refer to some process of causation.
And if emotions are not themselves causing anything it is difficult to see how they could be perceived. But if they are causing responses in the world (including the mind) then they clearly reflect some point of reference, which must be called either a cause, a mechanic, or ambiguous. That we don't have to perceive it this way does not refute objectivity so much as show that reasoning as we know it tends to be dynamic rather than unchanging. Simply because it has a dynamic property does not mean that it is utterly dynamic. For if that were the case, it would be causation alone. Instead, dynamic properties express the dynamic between the unchanging and causation, in every case that is not ambiguous. Because only the ambiguous is ambiguous, there is no reason to think that an observable pattern could be useful unless it consists of some dynamic condition (a mechanic) or an unchanging form (causation).
If there are categories beyond these it certainly would be something new and useful.
